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Our choice is influenced by choices we made in the
past, but the mechanism responsible for the choice
bias remains elusive. Here we show that the his-
tory-dependent choice bias can be explained by an
autonomous learning rule whereby an estimate of
the likelihood of a choice to be made is updated in
each trial by comparing between the actual and ex-
pected choices.We found that in perceptual decision
makingwithout performance feedback, a decision on
an ambiguous stimulus is repeated on the subse-
quent trial more often than a decision on a salient
stimulus. This inertia of decision was not accounted
for by biases in motor response, sensory processing,
or attention. The posterior cingulate cortex and fron-
tal eye field represent choice prediction error and
choice estimate in the learning algorithm, respec-
tively. Interactions between the two regions during
the intertrial interval are associated with decision
inertia on a subsequent trial.
INTRODUCTION
Our choice behavior is influenced by the history of choices and
the contexts under which the choices have been made. When
reward or performance feedback is given for each trial, the
choice behavior is modulated by the history of reward or error
feedback, and we learn to make an optimal choice given a sen-
sory context (Sugrue et al., 2005). The trial history effect, how-
ever, can also be observed when no feedback is given or when
we know that a decision should be made independently on
each occasion (Bertelson, 1965; Soetens, 1998; Fecteau and
Munoz, 2003; Gold et al., 2008; Kristja´nsson and Campana,
2010; Marcos et al., 2013). The bias in choice behavior is
thought to be due to internal signals that emerge from mem-
ories acquired through prior experiences with the sensory envi-
ronment as well as memories of past choices. In perceptual
decision making, these internal signals are thought to interact
with externally provided sensory signals and bias the decision
about the sensory stimulus (Albright, 2012; Awh et al., 2012;
Carnevale et al., 2012). It has also been shown that fluctuation
of neural activity in the frontal and parietal areas is predictiveof subsequent decision on an ambiguous stimulus (Williams
et al., 2003; de Lafuente and Romo, 2005; Carnevale et al.,
2012).
It remains open, however, how choices and sensory events in
the trial history contribute to the fluctuation of the internal signals
that bias decisions. This is partly because it is difficult to tease
apart multiple factors that could contribute to the internal bias
signals, such as sensory, motor, and choice processes. If the in-
ternal signals are due to a residual of the sensory signals in the
previous trials, the decision-biasing effect is expected to be
larger when a salient stimulus has been presented because the
stimulus elicits a larger neural response in sensory areas and
thus should leave a larger trace in the neural circuits. Alterna-
tively, if the internal signals are due to a residual of the motor
response-related signals, the biasing effect can be observed in-
dependent of the stimulus saliency. Contrary to these expecta-
tions, we found that a decision made on an ambiguous stimulus
was more often followed by repetition of the same decision on
the subsequent trial, in comparison to a decision made on a
salient stimulus.
The tendency of choice repetition has been treated as
random process in studies of decision making (Corrado et al.,
2005; Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Gold et al., 2008). Through
computational model fitting, simulation, and behavioral data
analysis, we instead show that this inertia of decision is best
accounted for by an autonomous learning rule to estimate the
choice likelihood, which is updated for every trial with the
following algorithm, CEn+1 = CEn + a(Cn – CEn). The crucial
feature of this mechanism is that in the absence of performance
feedback, the choice that has actually been made (Cn) serves as
a feedback to update the choice estimate (CEn). When little sen-
sory evidence is available for making a decision, the choice is
more likely to be made based on the estimate of the likely
choice. According to the learning rule, the choice thus made
updates the choice estimate toward the actual choice, and on
the subsequent trial, the decision is biased in favor of the
same decision as in the previous trial. Using fMRI as well as
concurrent transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and electro-
encephalography (EEG) recording, we show that the frontal eye
field (FEF) represents the updated choice estimate (CEn+1) and
medial parietal cortex/posterior cingulate cortex (mPC/CGp)
represents choice-based prediction error signals (Cn – CEn).
The results also suggest that the interaction between the two
regions is involved in maintenance and updating of the internal
signals responsible for the decision inertia.Neuron 81, 195–206, January 8, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 195
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Figure 1. Behavioral Experiment
(A) RT-version of two-direction motion discrimination task (RT2 dir).
(B) Choice repetition probability on trials with zero coherence motion. Mean and SEM (n = 14). prev-High, -Mid, and -Low: trials following high (coherence: 25.6%
and 51.2%), intermediate (6.4% and 12.8%), and low (0% and 3.2%) coherence trials. *p < 0.01 by post hoc test.
(C) A single-subject data for choice repetition probability. Positive and negative signs of current motion coherence (abscissa) indicate same or opposite motion
direction relative to the previous choice direction. Inset: odds ratio and 95%confidence interval for addition of the previousmotion coherence level as a covariate.
A value for prev-Mid (top) and prev-Low (bottom) as compared with prev-High is shown.
(D) Effect of previous error on choice repetition probability. Choice repetition probability on trials with zero coherencemotion, following correct and error trials with
intermediate coherence motion (prev-Correct and -Error). *p < 0.01 by paired t test.
(E) Multitrial choice history effect. The plot shows the probability of choosing a given choice ‘‘A’’ after a sequence of choice, ‘‘AA,’’ ‘‘AAA,’’ ‘‘AAAA,’’ and ‘‘AAAAA’’
(X = A, shown in red) and that after a sequence of choice, ‘‘AB,’’ ‘‘AAB,’’ ‘‘AAAB,’’ and ‘‘AAAAB’’ (X = B, shown in black). The data are shown separately when the
motion coherence in the immediately preceding trial is high (left) or low (right).
See also Figure S1.
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Decision Inertia Due to Choice EstimateRESULTS
Biasing Effect of Previous Choice on Ambiguous
Stimulus
Normal human subjects performed a reaction-time (RT) version
of a two-direction motion discrimination task (RT2 dir) (Gold
and Shadlen, 2007) (Figure 1A). Subjects indicated their
decision about the direction of coherent motion in a random
dot pattern with button press. No performance feedback was
given in each trial. We found that on trials with zero motion
coherence, subjects tended to repeat the same choice as in
the previous trial. Moreover, this choice repetition probability
was significantly higher when intermediate (6.4% and 12.8%)
or low (0% and 3.2%) coherence motion was presented on
the previous trial (prev-Mid and prev-Low) than when high
(25.6% and 51.2%) coherence motion was presented on the
previous trial (prev-High) (one-way ANOVA with factor of previ-
ous motion coherence [prev-Coh: prev-Low, -Mid, and -High],
Greenhouse-Geisser sphericity correction: epsilon (ε) = 0.79,
F(1.58, 20.6) = 17.2, p < 0.01, post hoc Sidak test: p < 0.01)
(Figure 1B).196 Neuron 81, 195–206, January 8, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.To quantify the biasing effect of the previous choice and its
changes depending on the coherence of motion stimulus in the
previous trial, we performed binary logistic analysis on the
choice repetition probability across all motion coherence levels
(Figure 1C). Here the motion coherence level on the current trial
was assigned a positive value when the direction of stimulus
motion was the same as the motion direction indicated by the
subject on the previous trial (previous choice direction) and
was assigned a negative value when the current motion direction
was opposite to the previous choice direction. As expected, the
choice repetition probability increased when the motion direc-
tion was the same as the previous choice direction, more so
with higher motion coherence in the current trial. Crucially we
found that addition of motion coherence level of the previous trial
as covariate significantly improved the fitting of the regression
curve: compared to prev-High trials, the regression curve was
significantly shifted leftward for prev-Mid and prev-Low trials,
indicating an increase in the choice repetition probability (p =
0.019 and 0.001, respectively, for the subject shown in Fig-
ure 1C). For 13 out of the 14 subjects tested, the odds ratio for
the addition of previous motion coherence level as covariate
Neuron
Decision Inertia Due to Choice Estimatewas significantly larger than 1 (p < 0.05). Relative to prev-High,
the mean leftward shift of the regression curve was equivalent
to 5.62% (95% confidence interval: 4.08–7.16) and 5.26%
(3.59–6.93) change in motion coherence for prev-Mid and
prev-Low, respectively. The biasing effect was also observed
in a delayed-response version of the task (DR2 dir) as well as
in a four-direction motion discrimination task (RT4 dir) (Figure S1
available online).
We reasoned that the biasing effect is due to internal signals
that persist across trials. If so, an erroneous decision should
have a larger biasing effect than a correct decision: on error tri-
als, strong internal signals are thought to have overridden the
externally provided motion signals to the opposite direction.
We indeed found an increase in the choice repetition probability
after error trials compared to correct trials (Figure 1D and Fig-
ure S1). Here we focused on trials with zero coherence motion,
preceded by trials with intermediate coherence motion (prev-
Mid). The choice repetition probability increased significantly
when subjects made errors in the previous trials compared to
when subjects made correct decisions (paired t test, two-tailed,
t(13) = 5.17, p < 0.01). Of note is that the subjects were not given
feedback of their performance and yet erroneous decisions
affected the choice on the next trial. This suggests that a mech-
anism associated with making an erroneous choice rather than
recognition of an error is responsible for the decision inertia
(see also Supplemental Analysis for the effect of RT in the previ-
ous trials).
Multitrial Choice History Effect
The result of the previous analysis indicates an effect of the
immediately preceding trial. The choice-biasing effect, however,
can be observed across multiple trials. We therefore compared
the probability of choosing a given choice ‘‘A’’ (right or left)
on a trial after a (n + 1)-trial sequence of the same choice
(A(n + 1)) and that on a trial after a n-trial sequence of the same
choice but with a different choice made on the immediately pre-
ceding trial (A(n)B). We conducted three-way ANOVA with fac-
tors of the number of choice repetition (n = 1 – 4), choice of the
immediately preceding trial (A or B), and motion coherence level
on the immediately preceding trial (high or low). We found signif-
icant main effect of the number of choice repetition (ε = 0.61,
F(1.84, 23.9) = 5.64, p = 0.011), which suggests an increase in
the probability of choosing the choice that has been repeated
in the preceding trials, more so as the number of choice repeti-
tions increases (Figure 1E). We also found a significant interac-
tion between choice repetition and last choice (ε = 0.71,
F(2.14, 27.8) = 3.75, p = 0.034), suggesting that the effect of
the last choice changes as a function of the number of choice
repetition. As can be seen in the figure, the cumulative effect of
the choice repetition in the previous trials (when the choice in
the immediately preceding trial, X, is A) disappeared when a
different choice was made in the last trial in the sequence (X =
B). Importantly, the effect of the last choice significantly inter-
acted with the motion coherence level of the last trial
(F(1, 13) = 5.50, p = 0.036), indicating an increase in the effect
of last choice when low coherence motion is presented on that
trial, which is a characteristic of the decision-biasing effect that
we report in the present study. The results suggest a multitrialmechanism for choice-biasing effects, which both maintains
and updates the internal biases.
Nature of the Internal Signals
We also conducted a series of control experiments in order to
tease apart the effect of the previous choice from other effects
such asmotor response bias, sensory bias, and attention. The in-
ternal signals responsible for the biasing effect can be the resid-
ual of an internally generated motor response for weak sensory
signals (motor response bias). To test this possibility, we intro-
duced a decision-response mapping cue and changed the
relationship between a decision andmotor response pseudoran-
domly across trials (DR2dir-MAP; Figure 2A). Thisdesignallowed
us to dissociate a decision-biasing effect from a motor response
bias. Two-way ANOVA on the decision repetition probability with
factors of prev-Coh (prev-Low, -Mid, and -High) and mapping
cue (repetition and switch) revealed a significant main effect of
the previous coherence level as in RT2 dir (ε = 0.98, F(1.95,
19.5) = 8.28, p = 0.003) (Figure 2B). This pattern, however, was
not modulated by the repetition or switch of the mapping cue
(main effect ofmapping cue: F(1, 10) = 0.73, p = 0.792; interaction
between mapping cue and previous coherence: ε = 0.75, F(1.49,
14.9) = 0.126, p = 0.823). The decision repetition probability was
significantly larger for prev-Mid and prev-Low than prev-High,
regardless ofwhether themapping cuewas repeatedor switched
from theprevious trial (post hoc test, p <0.05 for all pairwise com-
parisons). This means that subjects tended to perceive the mo-
tion as moving toward the same direction as in the previous trial,
even when they had tomake a different motor response to report
the motion direction. Thus, the motor response bias cannot
account for the decision-biasing effect.
Another possibility is that the internal signals responsible for
the biasing effect are due to an aftereffect of the sensory signals
(sensory bias). The difference in choice repetition probability be-
tween prev-High and prev-Mid/Low could be due to visual adap-
tation to high coherence motion in the previous trial, which may
bias perception away from the previous motion direction and
thus decrease the choice repetition probability. To examine
this possibility, we used RT2 dir task with continuous motion
stimulus during intertrial interval (ITI) (RT2 dir-IVS, Figure 2C).
Throughout the ITI of 2,850 to 3,150 ms, subjects were shown
a random dot pattern moving either to the left or right with coher-
ence level of 51.2% (intervening visual stimulus, IVS) but were
not asked to make a decision on the IVS. We still found a signif-
icant increase in choice repetition probability in prev-Mid and
prev-Low relative to prev-High (two-way ANOVA with factors
of prev-Coh and IVS direction, main effect of prev-Coh: ε =
0.88, F(1.77, 33.6) = 9.19, p = 0.001, post hoc test: p < 0.05) (Fig-
ure 2D). Crucially, the IVS direction relative to the previous
choice direction did not affect the choice repetition probability
(F(1, 19) = 0.22, p = 0.64). Interaction between the IVS direction
and previous motion coherence was not significant either (ε =
0.98, F(1.96, 37.3) = 1.35, p = 0.27). Thus, mere exposure to a
salient motion stimulus did not bias the subsequent decision,
suggesting that the choice-biasing effect is not due to an afteref-
fect of the sensory signals.
A third possibility is that the biasing effect is due to attention-
related modulation in the sensitivity to the sensory signalsNeuron 81, 195–206, January 8, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 197
ITI
1350 - 
1650 ms
RT
Delay
500 - 1000 ms
Stim on
1000 ms
B
or
A
Same Opposite
C DTarget stimulus
Intervening 
motion stimulus
Target stimulus
Stim on
= RT
ITI
2850 - 
3150 ms
Stim on
= RT
Direction of intervening motion stimulus
ITI
1350 - 
1650 ms
RT
Delay
500 ms
Cue on
500 ms
or
0
20
40
60
80
100
(%)
prev
-Low
prev
-Mid
prev
-High
prev
-Low
prev
-Mid
prev
-High
Attention cue repeat Attention cue switch
C
ho
ic
e 
re
pe
tit
io
n
E F
prev
-Low
prev
-Mid
prev
-High
prev
-Low
prev
-Mid
prev
-High
Mapping cue repeat Mapping cue switch
0
20
40
60
80
100
(%)
C
ho
ic
e 
re
pe
tit
io
n 
prev
-Low
prev
-Mid
prev
-High
prev
-Low
prev
-Mid
prev
-High
0
20
40
60
80
100
(%)
D
ec
is
io
n 
re
pe
tit
io
n *
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Figure 2. Behavioral Control Experiments
(A) Stimulus-response mapping task (DR2 dir-MAP).
(B) Choice repetition probability on trials with zero coherence motion, sepa-
rately shown for trials in which a mapping cue was repeated or switched from
the previous trial. Mean and SEM (n = 11). *p < 0.05 by post hoc test.
(C) Task with intervening visual motion stimulus during ITI (RT2 dir-IVS).
(D) Choice repetition probability, separately shown for trials in which the
direction of intervening motion is the same as or opposite to the previous
choice direction. Mean and SEM (n = 20). *p < 0.05 by post hoc test.
(E) Two-direction motion discrimination task for overlaid two-color random dot
patterns (DR2 dir-Overlaid). Red and green dots are presented in the experi-
ment.
(F) Choice repetition probability, separately shown for trials in which an
attention cue was repeated or switched from the previous trial. Mean and SEM
(n = 15). *p < 0.05 by post hoc test.
See also Figure S2.
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Decision Inertia Due to Choice Estimate(attention bias). Decision making on an ambiguous stimulus in-
volves selective processing of a stimulus feature favoring one
perceptual decision over the other, and the carryover of this
biased processing may contribute to the choice repetition bias
(Maljkovic and Nakayama, 1994). To examine this possibility,198 Neuron 81, 195–206, January 8, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.we used RT2 dir task for overlaid random dot patterns with red
and green colors (RT2 dir-Overlaid). Subjects indicated their
decision about the coherent motion for one of the two colors
indicated by a cue (Figure 2E). We found that a switch in the
attended color did not affect the choice repetition probability
(two-way ANOVA with factors of attention cue (repetition and
switch) and prev-Coh, main effect of attention cue: F(1, 14) =
0.892; p = 0.361) (Figure 2F). An increase in choice repetition
probability for prev-Low and -Mid relative to prev-High was
observed regardless of whether the attention cue was repeated
or switched from the previous trial (main effect of prev-Coh: ε =
0.90, F(1.79, 25.0) = 16.3, p < 0.001; interaction between atten-
tion cue and previous motion coherence: ε = 0.90, F(1.80, 25.2) =
0.037, p = 0.95; post hoc tests comparing between prev-Low
and -High, and between prev-Mid and -High for repeat and
switch: p < 0.05 for all). The result suggests that the choice
bias effect we report here cannot be accounted for by carryover
of attention (see also Figure S2 for further analysis of the data).
Model Fitting
We next conducted theoretical analysis to characterize the na-
ture of the internal signals responsible for the decision inertia.
The results of model fitting to the behavioral data also suggest
that the decision inertia is not due to an effect onmotor represen-
tations, to an aftereffect on sensory representations, or to a
carry-over effect of attention. Compared to a model without a
modulator variable that accounts for the previous motion coher-
ence (Basic Model), the fitting performance was no better for the
models in which the previous motion coherence modulates: (1)
the sensitivity to motion signals in direction-nonselective or
direction-selective manner (Models 1 and 2), (2) general choice
bias (Model 3), (3) tendency of repeating the same choice as in
the previous trial (Model 4), or (4) magnitude of the motion after-
effect (Model 5). The Bayesian information criteria (BIC) for
Models 1–5 did not decrease from the BIC for Basic Model (Fig-
ure 3A and Figure S3, see also Experimental Procedures and
Supplemental Analysis). These models failed probably because
they did not take into account the multitrial choice history effect.
We therefore tested models in which a choice is biased by an
internal estimate of the sensory signals to be presented (Model 6)
or by an estimate of the likely choice to be made (Model 7).
In Model 6, an estimate of the probable sensory signals at
nth trial, SEn, is updated by adding a product of a learning rate
parameter, a, and the difference between the actual sensory
signals (Mn) and sensory estimate (SEn) as in the equation,
SEn+1 =SEn +aðMn  SEnÞ. Here the prediction about the sen-
sory state is updated in a reinforcement learning (RL)-likemecha-
nism, although sensory signals (motion direction and coherence)
presented foreach trial are independentof eachother. Themodel,
however, did not improve the fitting relative to Basic Model
(Figure 3A and Figure S3). This is reasonable because when low
coherencemotion is presented (smallMn), an estimate of the sen-
sory signals (SEn) is updated to a smaller value, and the biasing
effect on subsequent trials is expected to become smaller, which
is contrary to the behavioral data that we have obtained.
In Model 7, by contrast, an estimate of the likely choice is up-
dated by the choice itself. An estimate of the probable choice,
CEn, is assumed to be updated based on the difference from
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Figure 3. Model Fitting and Simulation
(A) Sum of BIC across 14 subjects for the fitting of Basic Model (Base), and Models 1–9.
(B) Simulation data for the effect of previous motion coherence. Choice repetition probability on zero coherencemotion trials are plotted separately for prev-High,
prev-Mid, and prev-Low. Mean and SEM (n = 14). *p < 0.05 by post hoc test.
(C) Simulation data for the effect of previous error. Choice repetition probability on zero coherence motion trials are plotted separately for trials preceded by
correct and error trials with intermediate coherence motion (prev-Correct and prev-Error). *p < 0.01 by paired t test.
(D) Logistic regression analysis for the simulation data. The stimulus sequence and model parameters are taken from the data of the subject shown in Figure 1C.
(E) Thebiaseffects in theexperimental andsimulationdata, expressedby theequivalent change inmotioncoherence, shownseparately for prev-Lowandprev-Mid.
See also Figure S3.
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Decision Inertia Due to Choice Estimatethe choice that has actually been made (Cn) as in the equation,
CEn+1 = CEn + a(Cn – CEn). Of note is that in the present study,
no reward or performance feedbackwas presented for each trial,
and an actual choice is used in the place of feedback. This differs
from a standard RL mechanism in which choice (action) value is
updated based on the difference from the outcome such as
reward or performance feedback. There is, however, a hint that
the actual choice itself may induce a change in choice likelihood.
When choosing between items with a similar preference rating, a
chosen item is rated higher while a rejected item is rated lower on
the second time of preference rating, so-called choice-induced
preference change (Brehm, 1956; Izuma and Murayama, 2013).
An increase in the preference rating for a chosen item would
lead to an increase in the probability of choosing the same
item on the next occasion. We found that this error-based choice
estimate model outperformed the Basic Model as well as other
models (Figure 3A and Figure S3).
How then does this error-based choice estimation model
explain an increase in the choice repetition probability on trials
after low coherencemotion andmultitrial history effect? Decisionis thought to be made based on the sum of the external sensory
signalsmultipliedwith a sensory gain parameter and internal bias
signals, which in this model corresponds to a choice estimate
(CEn). When a decision is made on weak sensory signals at trial
n, contribution of the choice estimate to the decision variable is
large, and a choice tends to be made to the direction consistent
with the choice estimate (i.e., Cn and CEn have the same sign).
The actual choice thus made (Cn) is more likely to update the in-
ternal choice estimate toward a value of the actual choice (i.e.,
CEn+1 becomes closer to Cn; note that Cn takes a value of either
1 or 1, whereas CEn takes any value between 1 and 1; see
Experimental Procedures for detail). The choice estimate thus
updated (CEn+1) biases the subsequent decision (Cn+1) toward
the same direction as in the previous choice (Cn). Considering
that the mean of the learning rate parameter of the model, a,
was 0.39 (95% confidence interval: 0.18–0.68) (Table S1), such
increment of choice repetition probability can be observed
across several trials without reaching a ceiling. The behavioral
data of multitrial choice history effect are consistent with the
prediction (Figure 1E).Neuron 81, 195–206, January 8, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 199
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Figure 4. fMRI Experiment
(A) Activation in right medial parietal/posterior
cingulate cortex (mPC/CGp) associated with
choice prediction error (jCn –CEnj). Left: cross-hair
indicates peak activation and color bar indicates
t score. Middle: average percent signal change
(n = 14, mean and SEM) for trials in which the
choice prediction error is small, intermediate, or
large (0%–33%, 33%–67%, and 67%–100%
range). Right: choice repetition probability as a
function of mPC/CGp activation and previous
motion coherence. *p < 0.05 by post hoc test.
(B) Activation in right frontal eye field (FEF) asso-
ciated with updated choice estimate (jCEn + a(Cn –
CEn)j). Middle: average percent signal change for
trials in which the updated choice estimate is
small, intermediate, or large. Right: choice repeti-
tion probability on the subsequent trial as a func-
tion of FEF activation and motion coherence. *p <
0.05 by post hoc test.
(C) Activation in mPC showing psychophysiologi-
cal interaction during ITI between the right FEF
activation and the contrast of Decision Inertia (+)
ITI epoch > Decision Inertia () ITI epoch. Result of
random-effects analysis for 14 subjects (left) and
plots of BOLD signals from a single subject (right).
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Decision Inertia Due to Choice EstimateWe also constructed a model in which an internal estimate of
the sensory signals is updated based on the actual sensory
signals rather than sensory prediction errors (Model 8:
SEn+1 =SEn +aMn) and another model in which an internal esti-
mate of the choice likelihood is updated based on the actual
choice rather than choice prediction errors (Model 9:
CEn+1 =CEn +aCn). The fitting performance of the two models
was no better than the Basic Model (Figure 3A and Figure S3).
Model Simulation
We have also confirmed the validity of the choice likelihood esti-
mation model by simulation. The model parameters for each of
the 14 subjects were used, and the same sequence of sensory
stimulus as in the behavioral experiment (RT2 dir) was used as
an input to the model. As in the behavioral data, we found a sig-
nificant increase in the choice repetition probability on zero
coherence motion trials for prev-Low and prev-Mid than for
prev-High (one-way ANOVA with factor of previous coherence:
n = 15, ε = 0.74, F(1.49, 19.3) = 21.4, p < 0.001; post hoc test:
p < 0.05) (Figure 3B). We also found an increase in the choice
repetition probability on trials preceded by error trials than those
preceded by correct trials (paired t test, t(13) = 4.17, p < 0.001)
(Figure 3C). As for the binary logistic regression analysis, the
regression curve was significantly shifted leftward for prev-Mid
and prev-Low trials relative to prev-High (p < 0.05 for 10 and
13 out of 14 simulations for prev-Mid and prev-Low, respectively)
(Figure 3D). The mean leftward shift of the regression curve was
equivalent to 3.67% (95% confidence interval: 2.27–5.29) and
5.26% (3.47–7.26) change in motion coherence, respectively200 Neuron 81, 195–206, January 8, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.for prev-Mid and prev-Low (after exclu-
sion of one outlier, with a value larger
than 30%). By using the subject-specificmodel parameters and actual sensory signal strengths, the simu-
lation has successfully replicated the magnitude of decision
inertia in the experimental data for that particular subject. The
decision-biasing effects of prev-Mid and prev-Low were signifi-
cantly correlated between the experimental and simulation data
(n = 13, one outlier data point was excluded from the analysis,
Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient: r = 0.815
and 0.700, p = 0.001 and 0.08, respectively) (Figure 3E).
Model-Based fMRI Analysis
We next examined the neural mechanism for choice likelihood
estimation. We conducted fMRI experiments while subjects per-
formed RT2 dir task. Despite long ITI of 10–14 s in the fMRI
experiment, the choice repetition probability on zero coherence
motion trials was significantly higher for prev-Mid/Low trials than
prev-High trials (n = 14, paired t test, two-tailed, t(13) = 3.77, p =
0.002). In the fMRI data, we identified regions in which activation
time locked to the subjects’ button press response significantly
covaried with the trial-by-trial estimates of choice prediction er-
ror and updated choice estimate. Activation time locked to the
stimulus onset was accounted for within the same model with
parametric modulation according to the motion coherence level.
We found that activation in a region in the medial parietal cor-
tex extending to the posterior cingulate cortex (mPC/CGp) was
associated with choice prediction error on that trial (jCn – CEnj)
(Figure 4A). The activation increased as the absolute magnitude
of the choice prediction error increased. Activation in the puta-
men also covaried with the magnitude of choice prediction error,
thoughwith a subthreshold cluster size (Table S2).We also found
Neuron
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diction error, was associated with an increase in the choice
repetition probability when it was preceded by a trial with low
coherence motion (Figure 4A, right). Two-way ANOVA on the
choice repetition probability with factors of mPC/CGp activation
(high and low) and previous motion coherence (prev-High and
prev-Mid/Low) shows that there was a significant main effect
of the mPC/CGp activation on the choice repetition probability
(F(1, 13) = 5.65, p < 0.033), and a significant interaction between
the previous motion coherence and mPC/CGp activation
(F(1, 13) = 6.15, p = 0.028).
By contrast, activation in the right frontal eye field (FEF) was
associated with the updated choice estimate (jCEn + a(Cn –
CEn)j) (Figure 4B and Table S2). The activation was larger
when the absolute value of the updated choice estimate was
large. We also found that higher FEF activation, which reflects
a larger value for the updated choice, was associated with an in-
crease in the choice repetition probability for the subsequent trial
(Figure 4B, right). There was a significant main effect of the right
FEF activation (high and low) on the choice repetition probability
in the subsequent trial (F(1, 13) = 37.8, p < 0.001), and a signifi-
cant interaction between the motion coherence (High and Mid/
Low) and right FEF activation (F(1, 13) = 9.15, p = 0.010).
Signal Transmission between FEF and mPC/CGp during
Intertrial Interval
The information about the choice estimate represented in the
mPC/CGp and the FEF needs to be updated and maintained
during the ITI before biasing the decision on the subsequent
trial. Decision making is carried out in multiregion network and
it is likely that the biasing signals are updated and maintained
by the state of the network involved in decision making. We
therefore tested the possibility that the right FEF, which repre-
sented the magnitude of the choice bias, interacts with other
regions during ITI and that the network state thus biased is
responsible for the choice repetition on subsequent trials. A
specific prediction was that the interaction between the FEF
and other regions is larger during the ITI epochs following trials
with intermediate or low coherence motion and also preceding
trials in which subjects repeated the same choice as in the pre-
vious trial (Decision Inertia (+)) than the ITI epochs following tri-
als with high coherence motion or ITI epochs preceding trials
in which subject switched the choice from the previous trials
(Decision Inertia ()).
In the fMRI data, we found that during the Decision Inertia (+)
ITI epochs, fluctuation in the right FEF activation was associated
with a larger change in activation in the right mPC than during the
Decision Inertia () ITI epochs (Figure 4C, see also Table S3). Of
note is that the region thus identified (peak coordinate: 3, 63,
54) is adjacent to the region in which the activation during deci-
sion process is associated with choice prediction error (9, 66,
39). Correlation of blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD)
signals between regions, however, does not necessarily indicate
direct connections between the two regions: the correlation can
be due to common inputs from a third region. Also because of
the delay in hemodynamic response, the correlation of BOLD
signals may reflect interregional interactions during decision
making epochs rather than during ITIs.To examine whether the interaction with the FEF at a certain
time point during the ITI is associated with decision inertia, we
examined corticocortical signal transmission induced by FEF
stimulation (Morishima et al., 2009; Akaishi et al., 2010). We
gave a low-intensity single-pulse TMS (80% of the active motor
threshold) over the right FEF during ITIs and recorded TMS-
evoked potentials using EEG (Figure 5A). Here we used TMS
as a probe to examine the functional state of the neural network
without causing changes in behavior. In fact, TMS did not affect
the biasing effect of previous decisions on ambiguous stimuli
(Table S4). FEF stimulation induced significantly larger activation
in the mPC/CGp at 19.2 ms of the stimulation in Decision Inertia
(+) ITI epoch than in Decision Inertia () ITI epoch (p < 0.05 cor-
rected) (Figure 5, see Figures S4A–S4D and Table S5 for location
of nondifferential induced activation). Two-way repeated-mea-
sures ANOVA on the induced activation in themPC/CGp showed
a significant main effect of motion coherence of the preceding
trial (prev-Mid/Low or prev-High) (F(1, 16) = 14.3, p = 0.002)
and also a significant interaction between previous motion
coherence and choice repetition in the subsequent trial (choice
repeat or switch) (F(1, 16) = 5.7, p = 0.029). The results suggest
that the efficacy of signal transmission from the right FEF to
mPC/CGp is increased after decision making on ambiguous
stimuli and that this change in signal transmission is associated
with choice repetition bias (see Figures S4E–S4I and Table S6 for
signal transmission from parietal region to FEF). This mPC/CGp
region (peak coordinate: 5, 65, 45) is close to the region in
which activation covaried with the magnitude of a choice predic-
tion error in the fMRI experiment (9, 66, 39).
DISCUSSION
We found that a decision based on little sensory evidence tends
to be repeated on subsequent trials. Contrary to the view that
trial history effects on decision processes are due to a bias on
response generation or sensory processing, this decision inertia
cannot be accounted for by response bias, sensory bias, or
attention bias. We instead show that the decision inertia is best
accounted for by an autonomous learning mechanism of esti-
mating the likelihood of a choice to be made. Here we use the
term ‘‘choice’’ as distinct from action and, in the context of
perceptual decision making in the present study, a choice is
operationally defined as an act of selecting one of the two alter-
native perceptual reports in a given sensory context independent
of themotor response (Schall, 2001). The choice estimate, on the
other hand, can be taken to reflect the belief about the sensory
state, which biases the choice. This belief is updated for every
trial based on the choice prediction error, that is, the discrepancy
between the actual choice and choice likelihood estimate.
In value-guided decision making, an estimate of the state or
action value is compared with the state/action value determined
by reward or feedback about the state change (Samejima and
Doya, 2007; Rangel et al., 2008). However, a choice history effect
has been reported in matching behavior as well as in perceptual
decision making even when the reward or outcome history effect
has been covaried out: the effect has been accounted for by a
weighted sum of the biasing effect of the previous choices
(Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Gold et al., 2008). Here we have shownNeuron 81, 195–206, January 8, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 201
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Figure 5. TMS-EEG Experiment
(A) Experimental procedure.
(B) Activation in right FEF (latency: 8.8 ms; peak coordinate: 25, 0, 60) that reflects direct stimulation effect.
(C) Induced differential activation in mPC/CGp after FEF stimulation (latency: 19.2 ms; peak coordinate: 5,65, 45; t = 4.06). Contrast map for Decision Inertia (+)
ITI epoch > Decision Inertia () ITI epoch.
(D) Time course of cortical source density (CSD) in mPC/CGp smoothed with a Gaussian filter (full-width half-maximum: 4 ms). Mean and SEM (shading in light
color) (n = 17). Time zero corresponds to TMS.
(E) CSD value in mPC/CGp at 19.2 ms of TMS (vertical dotted line in D). Mean and SEM. *p < 0.05 by post hoc test.
See also Figure S4.
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Decision Inertia Due to Choice Estimatethat the choice history effect can bemediated by an autonomous
learning mechanism to update the choice likelihood estimate
based on the choice itself. In our model, the actual choice itself
serves as a feedback, with which the choice estimate is
compared and updated. The choice estimate thus updated
biases the decision on subsequent trials toward the direction
of the previous choice, especially when the previous decision
ismade on an ambiguous stimulus. The idea that the choice itself
updates the estimate of choice may seem counterintuitive. How-
ever, a similar idea of a choice-induced change in choice prefer-
ence has been reported in the literature of cognitive dissonance
(Brehm, 1956; Izuma and Murayama, 2013). The phenomenon
can be regarded as updating of the choice preference for a
particular item based on the actual choice made for that item,
which leads to an increase in the probability of choosing the
same item on the next occasion. It seems that when no outcome
information is provided externally, the decision system relies
more on internal information such as choice likelihood estimates
and the choices that have been made.
The adaptive mechanism of updating the choice estimate
is similar to the RL or other outcome-based mechanisms in
value-guided decision making. The information used for updat-
ing differs, however. While a decision outcome is used for updat-
ing the action/state value in value-guided decision making, an
actual choice that the subject hasmade seems to be used for up-202 Neuron 81, 195–206, January 8, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.dating the choice estimate in perceptual decision making
without performance feedback. We observed an increment of
the choice repetition probability according to the number of
repeated choices in the preceding trials and almost complete
disappearance of this tendency by just a single choice switch
made in the last trial (Figure 1E). This pattern of behavior is
consistent with our computational model based on the choice-
based prediction error. The pattern can also be consistent with
a Baysian change point detection model, in which an internal
state of the system is completely reset upon encounter with a
change in the environmental structures (Adams and MacKay,
2007; Nassar et al., 2010). The choice, in this scenario, reflects
the change in the belief about the environmental state.
We also found similarities in the neural mechanism between
learning of a choice estimate and reward-based RL. The mPC/
CGp region that we have shown to represent choice prediction
error is also shown to be involved in reward-based decisionmak-
ing: neurons in the CGp are shown to respond most strongly to
reward that deviated from themaximum reward obtainable (Hay-
den et al., 2008). It is also shown that the firing rate of CGp neu-
rons predicted switching to the alternative option on the next trial
after receiving large reward for a risky choice (Hayden et al.,
2008; Pearson et al., 2011). Crucially, the neural activity reflected
choice switch even when the reward-related variance was ac-
counted for. We in fact found that activation in the mPC/CGp
Neuron
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choice-induced changes in the preference are associated with
activation in the CGp (Izuma et al., 2010; Jarcho et al., 2011;
Kitayama et al., 2013), supporting the idea that this region is
involved in choice-based updating of the choice likelihood esti-
mate. Alternatively, the CGp may be involved in updating the
belief about the environmental state (Pearson et al., 2011).
Our finding that the FEF represents the updated choice esti-
mate is also consistent with neurophysiological studies showing
representation of a reward estimate of the past and current state
by prefrontal neurons (Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Kobayashi et al.,
2002; Barraclough et al., 2004). It has also been reported that
FEF neurons show an activity pattern that reflects the choice
and sensory strength even after reward delivery (Ding and
Gold, 2012). The activity can be interpreted as coding the choice
made in a specific sensory context, which may then be commu-
nicated to the mPC/CGp to calculate the choice-based predic-
tion error. We in fact found an increase in the interaction of
BOLD signals and in the efficacy of TMS-induced signal trans-
mission between the FEF andmPC/CGp during ITI that precedes
trials with decision inertia. The mPC is anatomically connected
with both the FEF and CGp (Cavada and Goldman-Rakic,
1989; Margulies et al., 2009), and it could be that the interaction
between the FEF and CGp is mediated via mPC. We suggest
that the neural interaction between the FEF and mPC/CGp
may reflect transfer of information about the actual choice and
choice-based prediction error and is involved in updating and
maintenance of the internal signals responsible for the decision
inertia.
The mechanism of choice likelihood estimation does not seem
to be useful for producing optimal behavioral in the present task.
Yet, the neural system computes an estimate of the choice to be
made using the actual choice to adjust the estimate, regardless
of whether that choice is correct or not. Nonoptimal tendency to
repeat the same decision has also been observed in a status
quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), confirmation bias
(Nickerson, 1998), and perceptual memory for an ambiguous
stimulus (Leopold et al., 2002; Pearson and Brascamp, 2008).
Unlike reward-based RL (Matsumoto et al., 2007; Ide et al.,
2013), activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was not
associated with choice prediction error in the present study. It
could be that nonreward-based updating of the choice estimate
involves only a part of the reward-based RL mechanism. Such
interpretation is plausible given that the projections conveying
the reward outcome are rich in the ACC but relatively sparse in
mPC/CGp (Amaral and Price, 1984; Berger et al., 1988). One
interesting possibility is that the RL mechanism is built upon
the choice-based learning mechanism. When reward is given
after a decision in this scheme, the reward information is used
to learn a decision-reward contingency within a circuit consisted
of ACC and basal ganglia, which then influences choices through
a choice-based learning mechanism that involves the CGp. In
fact, microstimulation of the CGp, which also represents value
information, increased the probability of a choice switch (Hayden
et al., 2008). Thus, the network we identified in the present study,
especially theCGp,might play an important role in translating the
reward information to the implementation of choice. In the future
studies, it is interesting to see how this autonomous mechanismof updating choice estimate interacts with reward-based and
sensory-state-based learning mechanisms.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Fourteen human subjects participated in the behavioral experiment using RT2
dir (mean age 27.1; range 20–46). Eleven subjects performed DR2 dir-MAP
(mean age 26.5; range 19–47). Twenty subjects performed RT2 dir-IVS
(mean age 25.4; range 19–46). Fifteen subjects performed RT2 dir-Overlaid
(mean age 25.3; range 20–47). Additionally 14 subjects participated in the
fMRI experiment (mean age 23.4; range 20–31), and 17 subjects participated
in the TMS-EEG experiments (mean age 25.5, range 19–42). None of the sub-
jects were taking any medicine and none had prior history of neuropsychiatric
disorders. Informed consents were obtained from all subjects prior to the
experiment. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Graduate
School of Medicine, the University of Tokyo.
Behavioral Paradigm
Subjects sat on a chair with their head fixed on a chin rest and watched a
monitor at a distance of 57 cm. The stimuli were white random dot motion pat-
terns (luminance: 123.1 cd/m2, dot density: 49.6 dots deg2 s1, visual angle of
each dot: 0.06) presented on black background (1.8 cd/m2) at the center of
themonitor in an aperture of 5 (refresh rate: 60Hz). A subset of dots was offset
from their original position every 50ms to create apparent motion at 5.0/s and
the remaining dots were replotted at random locations. For each trial, the per-
centage of dots moving coherently (motion coherence) was randomly chosen
from 0%, 3.2%, 6.4%, 12.8%, 25.6%, or 51.2%.
In RT2 dir, two white disc-shaped stimuli (choice target) were presented on
both sides of the monitor simultaneously with the random dot motion pattern.
Subjects pressed one of two buttons with the right index or middle finger de-
pending on whether the subjects perceived the stimulus as moving left- or
rightward. The random dot motion pattern and choice targets disappeared
when subjects made button press within 2 s of stimulus onset or when 2 s
elapsed without button press. ITI was varied from 1,350 to 1,650 ms, during
which subjects kept fixating at a white cross at the center of screen. The direc-
tion of motion and motion coherence level were pseudorandomized within an
experimental session; 73 trials 3 12 sessions were given.
In DR2 dir-MAP, subjects performed a delayed-response version of the task
with a stimulus-response mapping cue, which was consisted of left- and right-
ward pointing arrows, each of which was presented above or below the fixa-
tion cross. The two response buttons were arranged vertically and subjects
pressed upper and lower buttons with the right middle and index fingers,
respectively. Subjects indicated their decision by pressing the button that cor-
responds to the position of the arrow (upper or lower) pointing to the direction
of perceived motion. The arrangement of the two arrows changed pseudoran-
domly across trials such that on half of the trials subjects had to use the index
finger for the righward motion and, on another half, use the middle finger; 73
trials 3 18 sessions were given.
In RT2 dir-IVS, a random dot motion pattern with coherence level of 51.2%
was presented throughout the ITI (2,850 to 3,150 ms) of RT2 dir. A target
motion stimulus to which subjects had to make a decision can easily be distin-
guished from the intervening motion stimulus by the presence of two choice
targets (two white discs). The direction of the motion of the intervening stim-
ulus was either to the left or right; 73 3 10 trials were given.
In RT2 dir-Overlaid, subjects performed an RT version of two-direction
motion discrimination task for overlaid red and green random dot patterns.
Subjects indicated the perceived direction of coherent motion of the red or
green dots based on a cue presented 1,000 ms before the onset of a visual
target. The motion coherence level was varied at three levels (0%, 38.4%,
and 76.8%) across trials, independently between the two colors. The direction
of motion was also chosen pseudorandomly and independently between the
two colors; 73 3 12 trials were given.
For the fMRI experiment, we usedRT2 dir taskwith ITI varying from 10 to 14 s;
37 trials3 5 sessions were given. For the TMS-EEG experiments, we used RT2
dir taskwith ITI varying from1,700 to2,000ms;73 trials318sessionsweregiven.Neuron 81, 195–206, January 8, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 203
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The choice data were analyzed using binary logistic regression. For each
subject, the choice repetition probability, P, was given by
P= eQ=

1+ eQ

;
Q=b0 +b1Mcurr +b2Mprev;
whereMcurr is themotion coherence in thecurrent trial expressed in percentage
andwas given a positive or negative signwhen themotion direction on that trial
was the same as or different from the previous choice direction.Mprev is an in-
dex variable and was assigned a value of 1 whenmotion coherence on the pre-
vious trial was 0% or 3.2% (prev-Low), or 6.4% or 12.8% (prev-Mid), and a
value of 0 when motion coherence on the previous trial was 25.6% or 51.2%
(prev-High). The bi are free parameters andwere estimated using themaximum
likelihood method. b2 with an odds ratio significantly larger than 1 indicates a
significant effect of prev-Low or prev-Mid relative to prev-High. The ratio of
b2 to b1 provides an estimate of the effect size expressed in equivalent motion
coherence (%): a change in the motion coherence on the current trial by the
amount of this value in prev-High would result in the same size of an effect
on choice repetition probability as prev-Low or prev-Mid (Hanks et al., 2006).
We used repeated-measures ANOVA for statistical tests. When conducting
ANOVAwitha factorofmore than two levels, degreesof freedomwerecorrected
using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (epsilon, ε) for all cases.
Model Fitting
We first built Basic Model, whereby the probability of making a choice indi-
cating rightward motion direction (P) is determined by the following equation:
P= 1=

1 + eDV

;
where the decision variable at nth trial (DVn) is determined by the following
equation:
DVn = sMn + b+gCn1 + lMn1:
The motion signals at the nth trial,Mn, takes a value from 51.2 (strong left-
ward motion) to +51.2 (strong rightward motion), and the decision variable is
determined by the motion signals multiplied by a free parameter of sensitivity
to motion signals (s). The model also takes into account the general bias to
make a certain choice (b), a tendency to repeat the same choice as in the pre-
vious trial (g), and the magnitude of an aftereffect of motion signals in the pre-
vious trial (l). The choice at the nth trial, Cn, takes a binary value of either 1
or +1 (left or right choice). b takes a positive value if right-direction choices
are more prevalent and vice versa and its magnitude is scaled according to
other parameters. g takes a positive value if there is a tendency to repeat
the previous choice and takes a negative value if there is a tendency to switch
from the previous choice to the other choice. l takes a positive value if there
are more choices to the same direction as the motion direction in the previous
trial.
This Basic Model does not take into account the modulation of the decision
bias depending on the motion coherence level of the previous trial. We there-
fore created five models (Models 1–5) in which each term in the decision
variable is multiplied by a modulator variable, g:
g= ejMn1 j=h:
g is a function of the absolute value of the previous motion coherence, jMn-1j,
with a tuning parameter, h, which determines the slope of the modulator
variable against the motion coherence. As can be seen in the equation,
weak motion signal makes the modulator variable larger.
In Model 1, the sensitivity to motion signals (s) is modulated by the previous
motion coherence:
DVn = g3 sMn + b+gCn1 + lMn1:
In Model 3, the general choice bias (b) is modulated by the previous motion
coherence:204 Neuron 81, 195–206, January 8, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.DVn = sMn +g3 b+gCn1 + lMn1:In Model 4, the tendency of repeating the previous choice (g) is modulated
by the previous motion coherence:
DVn = sMn + b+g3gCn1 + lMn1:
In Model 5, the magnitude of the motion aftereffect (l) is modulated by the
previous motion coherence:
DVn = sMn + b+gCn1 +g3 lMn1;
Model 2 is a variant of Model 1 in which the sensitivity to motion signals (s)
is modulated in different manners depending on whether current motion
direction is the same as or opposite to the previous choice direction:
DVn =g
03 sMn + b+gCn1 + lMn1;
where the modulator variable, g0, is defined as
g0 = 1+ ejMn1 j=h; ifMn=absðMnÞ=Cn1=absðCn1Þ;
g0 = 1 ejMn1 j=h; ifMn=absðMnÞ=  Cn1=absðCn1Þ:
We also constructed models (Models 6 and 7) in which an estimate of the
sensory signals to be presented (SEn) or of the likely choice to be made
(CEn) is added to the decision variable.
In Model 6, an estimate of the probable sensory signals (sensory estimate,
SEn) is included in the decision variable. SEn takes a value from 51.2 to
51.2, thus accounting for both motion direction and motion strength:
DVn =uSEn + sMn + b+gCn1 + lMn1;
where u is a free parameter that determines the contribution of the estimate to
the decision variable. The estimate is assumed to be updated with an RL-like
mechanism as in the following equation:
SEn+ 1 =SEn +aðMn  SEnÞ;
where a is a learning parameter.
InModel 7, by contrast, an estimate of a probable choice to bemade (choice
estimate,CEn) is included in the decision variable.CEn takes a value from1 to
1 (a value closer to 1 indicates higher likelihood of the rightward choice). The
estimate was assumed to be updated based on the difference from the actual
choice (Cn), which takes a value of either 1 or 1:
DVn =uCEn + sMn + b+gCn1 + lMn1;
CEn+ 1 =CEn +aðCn  CEnÞ:
In addition, we constructed two models, in which an estimate is updated
based on actual sensory signals (Model 8: SEn+1 =SEn +aMn) or choice per
se (Model 9: CEn+1 =CEn +aCn) rather than based on prediction errors.
The models were fitted to the behavioral data for the RT2 dir for each of the
14 subjects, and the free parameters of the model were estimated by maxi-
mizing the likelihoods with Nelder-Mead downhill simplex optimization
method. Fitting was repeated for 20 times with different sets of initial values.
The values of the estimated parameters were stable across initial values.
fMRI Experiment
Imaging was performed using a 3 tesla scanner (Trio A Tim; Siemens). We ac-
quired 234 volumes of images sensitive to BOLD contrasts within a session
and conducted five sessions. After preprocessing, each trial was modeled
as a stick function time-locked to the onset of visual stimuli, which was
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). We also
modeled parametric modulation according to the motion coherence level of
the stimulus. Another stick function regressor time locked to the button press
was included in the model, with parametric modulator variables representing
the trial-by-trial estimate for choice prediction error and updated choice
Neuron
Decision Inertia Due to Choice Estimateestimate. As nuisance regressors, we entered the RT for each trial in order to
covary out the effect of the duration of visual stimul, and six dimensions of
head motion parameters to remove head motion artifacts. Images of param-
eter estimates were created for each subject and were then entered into a sec-
ond-level analysis using a one-sample t test across the 14 subjects. Height
threshold of p < 0.001 uncorrected and cluster size threshold of p < 0.05 cor-
rected were used. See Supplemental Information for detail.
We then tested whether the amount of activation in regions identified as
above (FEF and mPC/CGp) can be predictive of the decision inertia. We esti-
mated the neural activity in these regions by deconvolving the HRF from the
BOLD signal time series (Gitelman et al., 2003). For each motion coherence
level and for each scanning session, we categorized trials into halves depend-
ing on whether there was higher or lower activity relative to the median. We
tested the effect of activation (high or low) and its interaction with the motion
coherence on the choice repetition probability.
For the analysis of psychophysiological interaction during ITI, we calculated
the product of time course of estimated neural activity in the right FEF and the
vector of the psychological variable, which was determined as a box-car func-
tion corresponding to ITI epoch, with weighting of 1 for Decision Inertia (+)
and 1 for Decision Inertia (). For each subject, a general linear model was
computed, which includes, as regressors, the interaction term, the time series
of BOLD signals in the FEF, and the psychological variable. Phasic activation
time locked to the onset of visual stimulus was covaried out by including a
stick function regressor at visual stimulus onset with parametric modulation
depending on motion coherence level, which was convolved with HRF.
TMS-EEG Experiment
On 36 trials randomly chosen from 73 trials in each session, we gave a single-
pulse TMS over the right FEF at 500 ms before the presentation of a random
dot motion pattern. TMSwas applied with a figure-of-eight coil with a diameter
of 70 mm and Magstim 200 stimulator (Magstim). The position of the coil was
determined based on the surface brain image of the structural MRI for each
subject using Brainsight (Rogue Research). We simultaneously recorded
EEG with 60 electrodes using a TMS-compatible amplifier (BrainAmp, Brain
Products GmbH) (sampling rate: 2,500 Hz with 16 bit resolution). We used
sLORETA (Pascual-Marqui, 2002) for estimation of the cortical distribution
of current source density (CSD) that accounts for the scalp distribution of
TMS-evoked potentials (TMS-EPs). For each subject at each time point of
the local peaks of global-field power (GFP) within 60 ms of stimulation, CSD
map was created separately for Decision Inertia (+) and Decision Inertia ()
ITI epochs. The logarithmically transformed CSD values for each voxel of the
MNI space were compared between the two ITI epoch types in a pairwise
manner. We used a nonparametric permutation test with a threshold of p <
0.05 corrected for multiple voxels based on 5,000 randomizations (one tailed).
See Supplemental Information for detail.
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